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Abstract
This paper exploits a unique opportunity to test parallelism between the field and 
laboratory for the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). Most commodities in the 
United States have checkoff programs assessing producers for generic advertising and 
promotion, a public good for producers. Examples include: Got Milk? and the Incredible 
Edible Egg. Originally, participation in many of these programs used the VCM and the free­
riding observed follows a similar pattern to that seen in the laboratory by experimental 
economists. For example, a substantial amount of historical information is available for the 
egg industry’s generic advertising program. We simulate both the economic and 
psychological details of this industry in a parallelism experiment. The results over eleven 
rounds of the VCM conducted in the laboratory are strikingly similar to the real-world results 
for the American Egg Board’s program from 1977 to 1988. We also replicate the positive 
vote in favor of a mandatory program to replace the VCM that occurred in 1988. All 
commodity checkoff programs today are mandatory. Yet the constitutionality of mandatory 
checkoff programs has recently been challenged on the grounds that mandatory programs 
violate individual producer’s free speech rights under the First Amendment. In light of this 
legal uncertainty, this paper explores the feasibility of using a voluntary provision point 
mechanism (PPM) which closely follows the institutional design of the VCM and mandatory 
programs used by the egg industry. Our results suggest that although the PPM performs 
better than the VCM, both mechanisms in this institutional setting yield far higher levels of 
contributions than those obtained in prior research. Thus, the research next explores why the 
levels of giving observed for generic advertising are higher than traditionally observed in the 
lab. Our results suggest that the institutional design employed by the American Egg Board 
and others where assessments were collected first and then having producers request refunds 
afterwards, established a social norm, or reference point, which leads to higher levels of 
contributions through status quo bias. This bias appears to increase contributions in both the 
VCM and PPM. However, this effect decreases over rounds as contributions still appear to 
converge to the Nash equilibrium of zero contributions in the case of the VCM and to the 
particular Nash equilibrium of just covering costs of the provision point in the PPM.
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Most commodities in the United States have checkoff programs assessing producers 
for generic advertising and promotion, a public good for producers.1 Examples of the more 
popular programs include: Got Milk?; Beef, It’s What’s For Dinner; Pork the Other White 
Meat; Dancing Raisins; and the Incredible Edible Egg. The budgets for these programs total 
almost $1 billion annually in the agricultural sector alone (Forker and Ward, 1993), not 
including generic advertising for such other products as newspapers, plastics, steel, life 
insurance, pharmaceuticals and natural gas. Originally, participation in many of these 
programs was strictly voluntary in that all revenue came from donations from willing 
participants using the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). As might be expected, 
free-riding increased dramatically over time as contributions to the programs decreased 
substantially.
The free-riding observed with generic advertising follows a pattern very similar to 
that seen in the laboratory by experimental economists. For example, in the lab, Issac, 
McCue, and Plott (1985) have shown declines in average contributions from 39% of the 
maximum possible contribution in the initial round to 9% in the final round. However, 
contributions to generic advertising programs have typically started at a much higher level. 
For example, producer contribution to the American Egg Board started at 90.7% in the first 
year of its voluntary program and declined to 49.0% after 11 years. It is possible that the
1 Designed to increase the overall market demand for all firms within an industry, generic advertising and 
promotion programs are usually found in industries producing a relatively homogenous commodity with little 
potential for product differentiation.
3relatively high contributions resulted from the peculiar version of the VCM used to fund 
generic advertising. For example, the American Egg Board and other associations employed 
a version of the VCM in which all producers were assessed a per-unit amount but producers 
could request their money back by submitting a monthly refund application. The contextual 
shift of requiring a refund-by-request shifts the status quo from not contributing, as in the 
standard VCM, to contributing. Status quo bias suggests that the contribution rate should be 
increased by this contextual shift since decision makers are reluctant to leave the status quo, 
even in the face of economic incentives (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990, 1991). A number of additional studies have demonstrated status 
quo bias in insurance choice (Johnson et al., 1993), pension savings (Madrian and Shea, 
2001), internet privacy (Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse, 2002), and organ donation (Johnson 
and Goldstein, 2003),
The eventual failure of the refund-by-request version of the VCM to provide a 
sufficient level of support for generic advertising led to a majority vote by egg producers in 
favor of a mandatory program. For similar reasons, nearly all programs in operation today 
are mandatory and contain no refund provisions. Currently, there are 13 federal programs 
and numerous state checkoff programs in existence (more than 50 in California alone). It 
should be noted that the vast majority of economic studies evaluating commodity checkoff 
programs show substantial net benefits, with many showing rates of return in excess of four- 
to-one, as shown in Table 1.
The existence of an extraordinary amount of information on the egg industry and its 
generic advertising program makes for a unique opportunity to test parallelism between the 
field and laboratory. This paper describes experiments designed and conducted in an attempt
4to replicate the high initial level of contributions obtained in the field. Because the goal is to 
achieve parallelism, the experimental design is based on detailed data and market analysis of 
the national checkoff program for eggs, including information on the net own price elasticity 
of demand and elasticity of demand with respect to generic advertising. In addition, the 
experiment carefully attempts to capture the institutional details of the program from both an 
economic and a psychological perspective. This careful calibration, to match the field as 
closely as possible, allows for an assessment of the degree to which parallelism holds, by 
testing whether an experiment can replicate both participation rates over time (rounds) in a 
voluntary checkoff program and voting for or against a subsequent mandatory contribution 
(assessment) program. Data on actual participation rates and voting in the field can be 
compared to laboratory participation rates and voting across sessions. Thus, the first question 
raised is, can the high level of contributions for generic advertising programs and support for 
mandatory programs be replicated in the laboratory?
Even though they benefit producers, the constitutionality of mandatory checkoff 
programs has recently been challenged on the grounds that they violate the individual 
producer’s free speech rights under the First Amendment. For example, producers of 
organic, hormone-free milk may object to being forced to fund generic advertising for milk, 
because generic advertising does not differentiate between products. Two cases have gone as 
far as the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1997, the Court ruled in Glickman v. Wileman that the 
federally mandated checkoff program for California peaches, plums, and nectarines did not 
violate the First Amendment. However, in 2001, the Court ruled that the mandatory checkoff 
mushroom program did violate the First Amendment.2 Hence, there is uncertainty as to the
2 See Crespi, 2003, for an excellent analysis o f the history of legal challenges to mandatory checkoff programs.
5future constitutional validity of these programs, and because of this, there are numerous legal 
challenges to existing mandatory programs. Indeed, advertising for Washington’s apple 
program and the national Mushroom Council have been abolished because of negative court 
decisions. This raises a second question for experimentation: what, if  any, types of program 
should replace the current mandatory ones? The dilemma is that mandatory programs 
generally are highly effective in generating positive net benefits to producers, but voluntary 
programs using the VCM have been plagued by free-riding.
One obvious alternative is the provision point mechanism (PPM), which has been 
extensively in the laboratory and in the field (Dawes et al., 1986; Isaac et al., 1989, Bagnoli 
and McKee, 1991; Marks and Crosson, 1998, 1999; Rondeau et al., 1999; Krishnamurthy 
2001; Rose et al., 2002; and Rondeau et al., forthcoming). Under this mechanism, checkoff 
programs would still be voluntary, but the advertising program would exist only if at least a 
certain percentage of producers (the provision point) made contributions to it. If the 
percentage of producers making contributions were less than the provision point, all 
participants would receive a complete refund (money back guarantee) and no advertising 
program would be implemented. PPMs have been shown to significantly lessen free-riding 
compared to voluntary contributions, in laboratory experiments (Isaac et al., 1989, Rondeau 
et al., forthcoming) as well as in the field (Rondeau et al., forthcoming). Using the provision 
point mechanism for voluntary checkoff programs may be advantageous because this funding 
mechanism would not be subject to the current legal challenges, and it could reduce the 
degree of free-riding seen in previous voluntary programs. Thus, the second objective of the 
research is to develop and test a suitable provision point mechanism, one that would retain 
the refund-by-request feature that may have helped increase contributions in VCM programs
6for generic advertising. If the experimental design can produce results that successfully 
parallel field behavior with the VCM and voting on a mandatory program, the hope is that 
laboratory results for the PPM will have predictive power for real-world applications.
The third question examined is whether status quo bias is a reliable source of 
increased contributions for both the VCM and the PPM. In other words, does creating a 
status quo of giving significantly increase voluntary contributions? This hypothesis is tested 
separately for the VCM and the PPM by replicating both the VCM and the PPM portions of 
the parallelism experiment with a status quo of not contributing. If changing the status quo 
to giving significantly increases contributions in one or both mechanisms, this modification 
may be worth implementing in the field.
Experimental Design
Three separate treatments were designed. The first sought to answer both the first 
question of whether the high level of contributions for generic advertising programs and 
support for mandatory programs can be replicated in the laboratory and the second question 
of whether a PPM can successfully replace the current mandatory program. The other two 
treatments tested whether status quo bias is a reliable source of increased contributions for 
the VCM and the PPM.
Parallelism Treatment
In this treatment, each session involved four separate parts that differed with respect 
to the funding mechanism for the advertising program. Subjects participated in these parts in 
the same order to simulate the relevant real-world experience. Part A of the experiment did
7not involve an advertising program. Part B included an advertising program whose funding 
was provided through a version of the VCM in which subjects could request refunds of 
assessments taken from their revenue (refund-by-request). Part C had subjects determine, via 
a majority vote, whether they preferred to have no advertising program or have an 
advertising program that everyone was required to fund. Part 4 had an advertising program 
with funding provided voluntarily through a PPM that also featured a refund-by-request 
provision. Each experimental session involved 20 subjects as producers/sellers of a fictitious 
commodity.
Part A — No Advertising Program. To familiarize subjects with the experiment’s 
procedures, the first part of the experiment consisted of five rounds and did not include the 
advertising checkoff program. Subjects were randomly assigned to a computer that had a 
spreadsheet informing them of their costs for producing up to three units of the commodity. 
Each of the 20 subjects had two units that cost the same and a more costly third unit; third 
unit costs differed for each subject. Subjects incurred the cost of producing the units only if 
the units were sold. Subjects received written instructions (Appendix A), and the 
administrator provided a verbal description of the experiment and answered any questions.
Using Excel spreadsheets programmed with Visual Basic for Applications, subjects 
submitted their offers to sell their units to the experiment administrator. These offers were 
stored in an Access database. The administrative computer calculated the market price and 
the number of units sold by each subject. This information was also stored in the Access 
database. When notified by the administrator, the subjects retrieved this information and 
their spreadsheets calculated the profit in each round.
8The administrator acted as the buyer in the market, where demand was stochastic, 
ranging from 40 to 46 units. For each round, demand was determined by a subject randomly 
drawing one ball, with replacement, from a bag containing sixteen labeled bingo balls. The 
number on the drawn ball was the number of units demanded in that round. The numbers of 
the balls were based on a triangle distribution where the average demand (43 units) was 
represented by four balls, while the extremes (40 units and 46 units) were each represented 
by only one ball.
For simplicity, demand in the experiment was assumed to be perfectly price inelastic 
and the supply elasticity was set at 0.25. Previous estimated demand elasticities for eggs 
have all been close to perfectly price inelastic [e.g., Schmit and Kaiser (2003) estimated the 
price elasticities to be -0.04 and not statistically different from zero; Brown and Schrader 
(1990) estimated the price elasticity to be between -0.02 and -0.17]. Consequently, a 
perfectly price inelastic assumption here is plausible. The own price elasticity of supply is 
based on Schmit and Kaiser’s (2003) estimated elasticity. Additionally, the stochastic 
demand created price fluctuations that mimic the price fluctuations observed in commodity 
markets.
A uniform price auction determined the market price for each round by setting the 
price for all units sold at the first rejected offer. The uniform price auction is common in 
experimental settings because of its incentive-compatible characteristics, transparency, and 
ease of administration (Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1985). For example, if  demand is 43 units, 
the price for all units sold would be set by the offer for the 44th unit. Subjects were informed 
that in a competitive situation such as this, where the market price is set by the first rejected
9offer, it is in their best interest to submit bids equal to their costs, because otherwise they 
might miss an opportunity to make a profitable trade.
Part B — Generic Advertising Funded by VCM with Refund-by-Request. The second part 
of the experiment was conducted in much the same manner as the first, as subjects had the 
same costs and the uniform price market was used to determine the market price. The 
primary difference was that sellers in Part B were assessed $0.25 for each unit sold and the 
assessments collected were used to fund an advertising program that increased demand in the 
subsequent round. The assessment rate was set so as to parallel the high return on 
investment, roughly four-to-one, for eggs.3 This high return is frequently found with generic 
commodity advertising (Table 1).
Subjects were informed that “in previous experiments” the advertising program not 
only increased demand, but that the higher demand would also result in higher prices and 
higher profits for sellers. In fact, checkoff programs traditionally inform producers of all the 
benefits of generic advertising prior to the implementation of the program. Specifically, the 
advertising program increased the quantity demanded by:
Q d  Increase
2 *
3 I Ci=1
where Ci is the assessment collected for each subject, i=1,.. .,20. The advertising program 
increased demand above the initial range described earlier. Subjects were informed of the 
expected price that could result from different amounts of money given to the advertising
3 The cost, assessment, and price parameters used in the experiment were not designed to mimic every aspect of 
the egg market, but instead were designed to contextualize the producer’s decision of whether to contribute to 
the generic advertising programs.
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program. Subjects were also informed that whatever assessments were collected in the last 
round of Part B affected demand in an identical manner for the first round of Part C.
As in the voluntary checkoff program for generic advertising, subjects in this 
experiment could request a refund of part or all of their assessment. To request a refund, 
subjects submitted, via instant messaging, a confidential one-sentence request to the 
administrator stating the amount of the refund they requested, if  any. An example is “Subject 
#5 requests a refund of $0.25 for Round 8. Sincerely, Jane Doe.”
All refund requests were granted and refunds were added back to the subject’s profits. 
In each round, the administrator announced the total assessments possible, the total 
assessments actually collected, and the corresponding increase in demand. Note, that as with 
other VCM settings where the Marginal Per Capita Rate of Return (MPCR) is significantly 
less than one, the Nash Equilibrium for a subject is to request a refund of their assessments. 
Subjects always have the financial incentive to request a refund (free-ride), as it would 
provide them with the highest possible earnings in any particular round.
To simulate the discussions among producers that typically occur as part of the 
political process related to generic advertising programs, subjects were given up to five 
minutes prior to the start of Part B to discuss the advertising program as a group, and they 
were permitted to discuss strategy regarding the advertising program. The administrator 
facilitated the conversation (commonly referred to as “cheap talk”).
To replicate the experience of the American Egg Board, which funded its advertising 
program for eleven years (1977-1987) using the VCM with refunds, the second part of the 
experiment lasted eleven rounds. Though producers in the American Egg Board program 
were given the option to request refunds on a monthly basis, the experiment was designed to
11
simulate the decision whether to request a refund as an annual decision. This design choice 
was made a priori based on the common business practice of reviewing programmatic 
financial decisions annually.
Part C — Vote: Mandatory Program or No Program. After participating in a voluntary 
checkoff program for 11 years, the American Egg Board held a referendum in 1988 on 
whether to create a mandatory program or to have no checkoff program at all. To simulate 
this, subjects in the experiment were asked to vote on whether they wanted a mandatory 
checkoff program with no option of a refund, or no advertising program and no assessments. 
If the subjects elected the mandatory program, then in Part C sellers were again assessed 
$0.25 for every unit sold and the total assessments were used to fund the advertising 
program, since subjects were not able to request a refund. If the subjects elected the no 
advertising program option, then Part C operated identically to Part A.
Subjects were again given up to five minutes to discuss the vote with the entire group. 
A majority vote determined the outcome and Part C consisted of five rounds. Again, subjects 
were informed that whatever assessments were collected in the last round of Part C affected 
demand in the first round of Part D.
After tabulating the confidential votes, the administrator announced the election 
results and directed the subjects to the part of their spreadsheet that corresponded to the 
election outcome. If the mandatory program was elected, then in each round the 
administrator announced the total assessments collected and the increase in demand, as well 
as the uniform market price and the number of units sold. If no advertising program was 
elected, the administrator announced the uniform market price and the number of units sold.
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Part D — Generic Advertising Funded by PPM with Refund-by-Request. To simulate the 
potential transition that could result if  a mandatory generic advertising program were 
replaced by a voluntary PPM funding mechanism, the fourth and final part of the experiment 
involved twelve rounds that were identical to Part B, except that a PPM with refunds was 
employed. Again, subjects were assessed $0.25 for each unit sold and could submit 
confidential requests for refunds of their assessments. However, in this part, the advertising 
program was implemented only if at least 70% of the subjects did not request refunds. If 
more than seven of the 20 subjects in each experimental session requested refunds, the 
advertising program was not implemented and everyone received a complete refund of their 
assessments, whether they initially requested a refund or not.
Note that the provision point of 70% was based on the number of subjects not 
requesting refunds instead of applying the provision point to the total possible contributions. 
The advantage of tying the provision point to the number of subjects was its transparency, as 
the number of subjects in the experiment remained constant while the total possible 
contributions could potentially change in each round. Additionally, for practical policy 
purposes, a PPM based on the percentage of producers participating would likely be 
preferred because of its being perceived as more democratic.
If the 70% provision point was met, the advertising program operated identically to 
Part B, where the amount of money actually collected and the corresponding increase in 
demand was announced. In addition, in each round the number of subjects not requesting a 
refund was announced to the subjects. If the provision point was not met, the round operated 
identically to Part A and subjects were given the opportunity to reach the provision point in
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the subsequent round. After receiving written and oral instructions, subjects were again 
given up to five minutes to discuss their opinions and strategies regarding the advertising 
program.
Status Quo Treatments
These treatments exactly duplicate the parallelism treatment but with a status quo of 
not contributing rather than contributing.
Status Quo Bias #1: VCM with Contributions. The first status quo experiment focused on 
the role of status quo bias in the VCM (Appendix B). Consequently, the design consisted of 
two parts: Part A, five rounds without the advertising program, and Part B ’, twelve rounds in 
which the funds for the advertising campaign were raised by contributions given by subjects. 
None of the experiment parameters were changed, except that subjects were no longer 
automatically assessed $0.25 for every unit sold and subsequently given the opportunity to 
request a refund of these assessments. Instead, after the market price and number of units 
sold were determined, subjects were given an opportunity to contribute a maximum of $0.25 
for each unit they sold. To make a contribution, subjects entered their amount into their 
spreadsheet and completed a one-sentence instant message stating their intent. A sample 
message is “Subject # contributes $0.25 for Round 8. Sincerely, Jane Doe.” All contributions 
were accepted and the amounts were deduced from the seller’s profits.
Status Quo Bias #2: PPM with Contributions. The second experimental design focused on 
the role of status quo bias in the PPM (Appendix C). Consequently, the first three parts of 
the experiment design did not change from the parallelism design (Part A -  No Program, Part
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B -  Advertising Program funded by VCM with Refund-by-Request, Part C -  Vote on 
Mandatory Program). In Part D ’, the advertising campaign was implemented if 70% or more 
of the subjects gave “complete contributions,” where their contributions were $0.25 for each 
unit sold. This design mirrors the original Part D, in which the advertising campaign was 
implemented if 70% or more of the subjects “did not request a refund” of any amount. Part 
D was again run for twelve rounds.
Results
The results of eight experimental sessions (n=160) are reported here. The 
experiments were conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental Economic and Decision 
Research at Cornell University and the subjects were recruited from introductory economics 
courses at Cornell University. The four-part experiments lasted two hours and, on average, 
subjects earned $35; the status quo test of the VCM with contributions lasted one hour and 
subjects earned approximately $18. The results of the parallelism experiments will be 
described first, and then the tests of status quo bias for the VCM and PPM will be presented.
Parallelism Experiment
Part A - No Advertising Program. Part A was designed to familiarize subjects with the 
experiment and to give them experience with the uniform price auction. Over these five 
rounds, subjects also learn through experience that, in a competitive situation, it is to their 
advantage to submit offers equal to cost. On average, the producer surplus was $25.93 
(Table 2).
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Part B - Advertising Program Funded by VCM with Rebate-by-Request. The most striking 
result of Part B is that the percentage of the total possible given to the advertising campaign 
in the lab parallels the percentage of total possible given to the advertising program of the 
American Egg Board from 1977 to 1987 (Figure 1). In the first round, subjects gave 86.2% 
of the total possible to fund the advertising program. This percentage is nearly identical to 
the field result of 90.7% in the first year that the American Egg Board used the VCM with 
rebates to fund its advertising program. The percentage of contributions gradually declined 
and reached only 50.8% of total possible assessments by Round 11. Again, this decline is 
almost identical to the America Egg Board results, where 49% of the possible contributions 
to the advertising campaign were made by egg producers in 1987.
The introduction of the advertising program significantly raised producer surplus 
(Table 2). However, producer surplus declined after early rounds because of free-riding on 
contributions for the advertising campaign. After the peak of $90.36 in Round 4 of Part B, 
producer surplus decreased by 48% to $47.08 by Round 11 of Part B (Figure 2).
Part C - Vote and Mandatory Funding. In each of the four experimental sessions, subjects 
overwhelmingly voted to implement the advertising program with mandatory funding (no 
option of refund request). On average, 92.5% of the subjects voted for the mandatory 
program, which again is close to the result in the field, where 84% of egg producers voted in 
favor of a mandatory program in 1988. The producer surplus with the mandatory program 
part of the experiment was the highest of all four parts, averaging $79.63 (Table 2).
The results from the first three parts suggest that the experiment design produces 
results that mimic the field results remarkably well. That is, the lab results were able to
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reproduce the high initial level of contribution observed in the field, the pattern of 
deterioration in contributions, and the subsequent landslide vote for the mandatory program. 
Given the degree of parallelism obtained, it appears reasonable to address the second 
question regarding what type of program should replace the current mandatory one.
Part D — Advertising Program Funded by PPM with Refund-by-Request. The PPM with 
refund-by-request offers slightly lower producer surplus ($73.25) than the mandatory 
program does ($79.63), though this decrease is not statistically significant at the a  = 0.05 
level (t = .92, p  = 0.183) (Table 2). More importantly, however, producer surplus does not 
experience the sharp decline observed in the VCM with refund-by-request (Figure 2).
The percentages of contributions collected for the advertising campaign in the first 
rounds of the VCM and PPM are virtually identical (Table 3). In the first round of Part D 
(PPM-Refunds), 82.5% of the subjects did not request refunds, resulting in 83.6% of the 
possible money being given to the advertising campaign. These levels are statistically 
indistinguishable from the 85.0% of the subjects that did not request refunds in Part B 
(VCM-Refunds), resulting in 88.9% of the total possible contribution going to the advertising 
campaign. While there was significant deterioration in the level of contributions in the 
VCM-Refunds with refund-by-request, there was no deterioration in the PPM-Refunds 
(Figure 3). By the eleventh round of the PPM, 78.8% of subjects were not requesting 
refunds, resulting in 79.6% of the total possible being contributed, both statistically 
insignificant changes (z = 0.60, p  = 0.548; t = 0.65, p  = 0.514, respectively). In contrast, in 
the VCM, only 50.0% of the subjects were not requesting refunds in the eleventh round, 
resulting in only 51.5% of the total possible being contributed (t = 4.03, p  = 0.000; z = 4.09,
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p  = 0.000, respectively). Not surprisingly, this 35.0% decrease in percentage of subjects not 
requesting refunds and corresponding 33.4% drop in contributions between the first and 
eleventh rounds is significant at the a  < 0.01 level.
As in other experiments involving repeated PPM rounds (Issac, Schmitdz, and 
Walker, 1989, Marks and Crosson, 1998, 1999, and others), in some of the rounds sellers did 
not reach the provision point because less than 70% of the subjects did not request refunds.
In the experimental sessions, the provision point was achieved 90.9% of the time (40 out of 
44), which is again higher than the percent achieved in previous PPM experiments. This 
result further supports the hypothesis that having to request a refund by submitting a simple 
message helps establish a social norm, or reference point, which leads to higher levels of 
contribution for the public good, consistent with status quo bias.
Status Quo Bias Experiments
Part B ’ -  VCM-Contribution. To test whether status quo bias resulted in increased 
contributions to the VCM, two additional experimental sessions (n = 40) were conducted. 
These sessions consisted of two parts. The first part was identical to the original Part A. In 
the second part (referred to as Part B ’), subjects funded the advertising campaign using a 
VCM by making contributions (referred to as VCM-Contribution), instead of not requesting 
refunds of assessments that had automatically been deduced from their profits (VCM- 
Refund).
Even though there was no financial difference between this design and the parallelism 
design, this change of status quo led to dramatically lower giving to the advertising campaign 
(Figure 4). As shown in Table 4, in the first round only 50.0% of the total possible was 
actually contributed to the advertising campaign, 38.9% less than the percentage of first
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round giving (88.9%) in the VCM-Rebate design (t = -5.25, p  = 0.000). By the eleventh 
round, subjects in the VCM-Contribute design contributed only 15.1% of the total possible, 
which again was much lower than the 51.5% of total possible contributed in VCM-Rebate (t 
= 4.03, p  = 0.000). Interestingly, the pattern of deterioration of giving in the VCM- 
Contribution design was quite similar to that observed in the VCM-Refund design. 
Contributions in the VCM-Contribution design dropped by 34.9% over the eleven rounds, 
while contributions in the VCM-Refund design dropped by 37.4% (t = -0.28, p  = 0.776).
Part D ’ -  PPM-Contribution. The impact of status quo bias on the PPM also appears to be 
significant, though less dramatic. The largest impact appears to be in initial rounds (Table 5). 
For example, in the first round, 62.5% of subjects in the PPM-Contribution design gave 
“complete contributions,” in contrast to the 82.5% of subjects in the PPM-Rebate design who 
“did not request refunds,” a difference of 20.0% (z = -2.41, p  = 0.016) (Figure 5). But by the 
eleventh round, this difference narrowed to 11.3% and was no longer statistically significant, 
as subjects in both designs appear to be converging to the Nash equilibrium (to make 
“complete contributions” or “not to request refunds” 70% of the time). Averages across all 
eleven rounds suggest that status quo bias affects the PPM, especially with regard to the 
number of “complete contributions,” which was 16.3% lower in the PPM-Contribution than 
the number of “no refund requests” in the PPM-Refunds (z = 1.96, p  = 0.050).
The results additionally suggest that the efficiency of the policy would be greatly 
increased if the PPM could be implemented with refunds. In the PPM-Refund design, the 
threshold of 70% or more of subjects not requesting a refund was achieved 90.9% of the 
time, while in the PPM-Contribute design, the 70% threshold was achieved only 40.9% of 
the time (z = 5.04, p  = 0.000)
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Conclusions
The results of the parallelism experiment over both the eleven rounds of the VCM 
and the follow-up vote on a mandatory generic advertising program are strikingly similar to 
the real-world results for the American Egg Board’s program from 1977 to 1988. This 
outcome suggests that it is at least possible that the laboratory can be used as an inexpensive 
way to test mechanism details that may predict outcomes if the mechanism is implemented in 
the field. It is also likely that both the economic and psychological context of decisions must 
be carefully replicated if the goal is prediction of field behavior rather than testing economic 
theory.
It also appears that the version of the PPM tested can yield far higher levels of 
contributions than the VCM for generic advertising in repeated settings, which is consistent 
with prior research. In the case of generic commodity advertising, the advantages of the 
PPM are two-fold: it is voluntary, and therefore potentially avoids the legal challenges noted 
above that mandatory programs currently face, and in this setting it has the potential for a 
high level of success, since the 70% participation threshold was met 90.9% of the time. If 
parallelism holds, such programs are likely to be highly successful and popular, since higher 
levels of funding for generic advertising can lead to higher levels of demand, price, and 
profits for producers.
Finally, a status quo of giving appears to significantly increase contributions in both 
the VCM and PPM. The process of collecting assessments first and having producers request 
refunds afterwards establishes a social norm or reference point that leads to higher levels of 
contributions through status quo bias. In addition, any transactions costs of withdrawing may 
also support the status quo of giving. Thus, the efficiency of both the VCM and PPM can be
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enhanced through status quo bias wherever establishing a status quo of contributing is 
feasible. However, it appears that the effect of a status quo of giving decreases over rounds, 
since there still appears to be a convergence to the Nash equilibrium of zero contributions in 
the case of the VCM (albeit from a higher initial level), and to the particular Nash 
equilibrium of just covering costs of the provision point in the PPM. If subjects are 
attempting to just reach the provision point, failure rates will logically be about 50% rather 
than the 90% obtained initially with a status quo of contributing. Thus, single shot 
applications, or applications with a limited number of repetitions of either the VCM or PPM, 
will likely show the greatest benefit from status quo bias.
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Table 1. Estimated Rate of Return on Investment in Generic Advertising for Various 
Commodities
Commodity Study Return on Investment
Eggs
Dairy
Beef
Cotton
Orange juice
Pork
Soybeans
Almonds
Walnuts
Kaiser and Schmit (2000) 1.8 to 6.7 
Kaiser (1997) 3.4 
Ward (1998) 4.9 to 6.7 
Nichols,J.P., et al (1997) 3.2 to 3.5 
Capps et al. (2003) 2.9 to 6.1 
Davis, et al. (2001) 4.8 to 26.2 
Williams et al. (1998) 8.3 
Crespi and Sexton (2000) 4.5 to 6.9 
Kaiser (2002) 4.0
Table 2. Producer Surplus in Each Part of the Experiment
Part A Part B Part C Part D
Producer Surplus $ 25.93 $ 63.58 $ 79.96 $ 73.25
Difference from Part A $ 37.65 ** $ 54.03 ** $ 47.32 **
Difference from Part B $ 16.38 * $ 9.67 *
Difference from Part C $ (6.71)
* a < 0.05
a < 0.01
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Table 3. PPM-Refund and VCM-Refund
Percent of
Total
n Possible Diff. T-Stat. P-value
1st Round PPM-RefundVCM-Refund
80
80
83.6%
86.2% -2.6% -0.46 0.646
11th Round PPM-Refund 80 79.6%VCM-Refund 80 50.8% 28.8% 3.82 0.000
Difference between PPM-Refund 80 -4.0%
1st and 11th Round VCM-Refund 80 -35.4% 31.4% -4.99 0.000
# Not Requesting
Refunds / Obs. Percentage Diff. Z-Stat. P-value
1st Round PPM-Refund 66 / 80 82.5%VCM-Refund 65 / 80 81.3% 1.2% 0.21 0.837
11th Round PPM-Refund 63 / 80 78.8%VCM-Refund 40 / 80 50.0% 28.8% 3.80 0.000
Difference between PPM-Refund 3 / 80 -3.7%
1st and 11th Round VCM-Refund 25 / 80 -31.3% 27.6% -4.58 0.000
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Table 4. VCM-Refunds and VCM-Contributions
Percent of
Total
n Possible Diff. T-Stat. P-value
1st Round VCM-Contribution 40 50.0%VCM-Refund 80 86.2% -36.2% -4.27 0.000
11th Round VCM-Contribution 40 15.1%VCM-Refund 80 50.8% -35.7% -3.78 0.000
Difference between VCM-Contribution 40 -34.9%
1st and 11th Round VCM-Refund 80 -35.4% 0.5% -0.05 0.957
# of "Complete 
Contributions"
or "No Refund
Request" / 
Obs.
Percentag
e Diff. Z-Stat. P-value
1st Round VCM-Contribution 16 / 40 40.0%VCM-Refund 65 / 80 81.3% -41.3% -4.55 0.000
11th Round VCM-Contribution 2 / 40 5.0%VCM-Refund 40 / 80 50.0% -45.0% -5.06 0.000
Difference between VCM-Contribution 14 / 40 -35.0%
1st and 11th Round VCM-Refund 25 / 80 -31.3% -3.7% 0.41 0.679
Table 5. PPM-Rebate and PPM-Contributions
Percent of
Total
n Possible Diff. T-Stat. P-value
1st Round PPM-Contribution 40 67.3%PPM-Refund 80 83.6% -16.3% -2.04 0.042
11th Round PPM-Contribution 40 73.9%PPM-Refund 80 79.6% -5.7% -0.71 0.480
Average PPM-Contribution 40 69.0%PPM-Refund 80 81.5% -12.5% -1.54 0.123
# of "Complete 
Contributions" or
"Not Requesting 
Refunds" / Obs. Percentage Diff. Z-Stat. P-value
1st Round PPM-Contribution 25 / 40 62.5%
PPM-Refund 66 / 80 82.5% -20.0% -2.41 0.016
11th Round PPM-Contribution 27 / 40 67.5%PPM-Refund 63 / 80 78.8% -11.3% -1.34 0.180
Average PPM-Contribution 26 / 40 65.0%
PPM-Refund 65 / 80 81.3% -16.3% 1.96 0.050
Figure 1. Percentage of Total Possible Contributions: VCM-Refund and Field Results
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Figure 3. Percentage of Total Possible Contributions: VCM-Refund and PPM-Refund
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Figure 4. Percentage of Total Possible Contribution: VCM-Refund and VCM-Contribution.
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Figure 5. Percent of “Complete Contributions” in PPM-Contributions and “No Refund 
Request” in PPM-Refund
— ■— PPM-Refund 
■ - ♦  - ■ PPM-Contribution
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